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             Abstract 
The congruency sequence effect (CSE) reflected by the influence of the congruency of 
the previous trial on the current one translates improved cognitive control (CC). Yet, it 
remains debated whether reactive or proactive control processes mostly contribute to 
this effect. To address this question, we administered a Stroop task controlling for 
effects of feature repetition and contingency learning to a large group of participants, 
where we manipulated the frequency of incongruent trials in a block-wise fashion to 
induce either proactive (high conflict frequency) or reactive (low conflict frequency) 
control. Moreover, as the presentation of trial-by-trial evaluative feedback could 
influence control processes operating at a local level, we compared effect of evaluative 
vs. neutral feedback on the CSE, for each control mode separately. We tested the 
prediction that CSE should be influenced by conflict frequency and feedback type 
concurrently. Results showed that when evaluative feedback was used, the CSE was 
increased if conflict frequency was low, confirming that the CSE stemmed from 
reactive control mainly. If conflict frequency was high, a different sequence effect was 
observed. The use of neutral feedback abolished the modulation of the CSE by conflict 
frequency. Moreover, correlation results showed that reappraisal, corresponding to a 
proactive emotion regulation strategy, was negatively related to the CSE in this 
condition, suggesting that proactive control can alleviate the reactive dominance of the 
CSE. Altogether, these results suggest that CC is flexible, and its expression depends on 
the subtle balance between proactive and reactive control processes. 
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Cognitive control (CC) is a fundamental ability that helps people to flexibly adjust attention 
and decision making according to current goals, particularly when overcoming prepotent or 
habitual responses (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Shenhav, Cohen, & Botvinick, 2016). This 
ability is fairly complex and assisted by different processes that can be dissociated from one 
another. According to the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) framework, CC is not unitary 
but two distinct control modes can be identified, namely reactive and proactive control 
(Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007, Braver, 2012). Upon the detection of interference, especially 
if it is unexpected and/or of large magnitude, reactive control is used to reduce or resolve it, 
corresponding in turn to a ‘late correction’ mechanism (Braver, 2012). However, in some 
situations, the encounter of interference can also be anticipated and specific preparatory or 
sustained control processes changed accordingly. In this case, proactive control is used and it 
can be conceptualized as an ‘early selection’ mechanism (Geng, 2014; Braver et al., 2007). 
Using interference paradigms (i.e. Stroop task, Flanker task, or Simon task), it is generally 
assumed that the magnitude of the congruency effect (CE) can be regarded as a signature of 
proactive control mode, in which higher CE translates impaired proactive control (Funes, 
Lupianez, & Humphreys, 2010). In comparison, the modulation of the previous congruency 
on the current ones, which is called the congruency sequence effect (CSE), is usually 
explained by conflict adaptation where reactive control operates dynamically at a local, trial-
by-trial level (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010; Alpay, Goerke, & 
Stürmer, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2001). CC is adaptive and flexible in the sense that the 
involvement of reactive and proactive control processes actually depends upon specific 
factors that can be external or internal, and manipulated at the experimental level. For 
instance, previous studies clearly showed that CC can be geared towards proactive control 
when the frequency of incongruent trials within the block is transiently increased (Bugg, 
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2012; Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016), the duration or gap between two consecutive trials is 
increased (Egner et al., 2010), or specific cues informing about the nature of the upcoming 
trial type are used (Aarts, Roelofs, & Van Turennout, 2008). Hence, the amount of reactive 
and proactive control used to deal with interference likely varies depending on specific factors 
(Torres-Quesada, Funes, & Lupianez, 2013; Funes et al., 2010). Further, the variability in CC 
seen across trials and subjects, as well as tasks or contexts, can probably be accounted for in 
part by variable transition effects from one dominant control mode to the other one (Braver, 
Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Paxton, Barch, Racine, & Braver, 2008). 
As mentioned here above, the CSE is usually regarded as the expression of a transient 
control mechanism, being primarily reactive (Egner et al., 2010; Alpay, Goerke & Sturmer, 
2009). This interpretation is also in line with the dominant conflict-monitoring theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). However, the fact that the CSE is mostly conceived as a form of 
reactive control does not invalidate the notion that it can also be influenced by concurrent 
control processes that are mostly proactive in essence. For example, a typical CSE was 
previously reported in situations where proactive control presumably dominated, because of 
the use of a larger frequency of incongruent trials within the block (Soutschek, Strobach, & 
Schubert, 2014; Torres-Quesada et al., 2013), or the presentation of a cue informing about the 
imminent occurrence of conflict (Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009). 
Further, it has even been proposed that the more efficient conflict processing usually 
observed after incongruent trials compared with congruent ones might actually reflect in part 
the proactive preparation occurring from one trial onto the next one (Duthoo, abrahamse, 
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; Hinault, Badier, Baillet, & Lemaire, 2017). Therefore, 
proactive control likely modulates conflict-driven adaptive control, in the sense that it is 
probably shaped by specific preparatory processes which are based on specific expectations 
(Gratton et al., 1992), or through activating processes that anticipate conflict and are meant to 
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reduce interference (Burgess, & Braver, 2010), or perhaps its negative or aversive nature 
(Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). As put forward recently, it is plausible that the CSE corresponds 
to a reactively triggered control mode that leads to short-term increase in proactive control 
(Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Scherbaum, Dshemuchadse, Fischer & Goschke, 2010; 
Appelbaum, Boehler, Davis, Won, & Woldorff, 2014). In this framework, the variable and 
concurrent involvement of these two control mechanisms within the same trial provides a 
rather efficient way to overcome the limitations imposed by the use of proactive or reactive 
control exclusively, with the former being resources consuming and the latter associated with 
lower or slower performance (Karayanidis et al., 2009). Thus, it appears parsimonious to 
regard the CSE as a blend of reactive and proactive cognitive control processes, implying in 
turn that CC operates at different levels and perhaps different scales, either globally and 
before the conflict arose in the case of proactive control, or instead locally and after it, in the 
case of reactive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Bugg, 2012; Suzuki & 
Shinoda, 2015; Rigoni, Braem, Pourtois, & Brass, 2016).  
The main goal of the current study was to assess whether proactive or reactive control 
mechanisms underpinned the CSE. More specifically, we assessed whether systematic 
variations in the relative contribution of proactive vs. reactive control processes could 
modulate its expression and magnitude. To this end, we altered the frequency of incongruent 
trials in a block-wise fashion, a standard method that has been used in previous studies (Funes 
et al., 2010; Soutschek et al., 2014; Grützmann, Riesel, Klawohn, Kathmann, & Endrass, 
2014). Specifically, we induced proactive control by increasing the frequency of incongruent 
trials to 70% in specific blocks. In different blocks, this frequency was set to 50% (meaning a 
balanced number of congruent and incongruent trials) and hence, as a result, the use of 
reactive control mode was promoted therein. 
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Crucially, we then assessed, in a factorial design, how this specific variable (i.e. conflict 
frequency) could interact with another one, namely the type of performance feedback used. 
The presentation of evaluative feedback at the single trial level could be used as a means to 
influence control processes operating at a local level, and hence the balance between 
proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Locke, Braver, 2008). Based on the evidence 
reviewed here above, we reasoned that evaluative feedback should have different impacts on 
the CSE depending on conflict frequency. More specifically, evaluative feedback (with a 
higher motivational significance) should strengthen reactive control when conflict frequency 
is low, thereby increasing the CSE (see also Van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009, 2012; 
Yang & Pourtois, 2018). By comparison, this increase in the size of the CSE should not be 
observed when conflict frequency is high and thus proactive control presumably dominates. 
Further, we hypothesized that neutral feedback, which is devoid of any specific motivational 
significance, should not influence the CSE depending on conflict frequency (see Yang & 
Pourtois, 2018). To test this prediction, we therefore manipulated the type of feedback 
presented at the single trial level across different blocks. After each response, a single 
feedback was always presented after a fixed 700ms interval, hence it was always contingent 
on this event. However, in half of the blocks, this feedback was evaluative since it provided 
information about actual task performance (accuracy and speed). Hence, either a positive or 
negative feedback was presented depending on actual performance. In the other half, the 
feedback was always neutral (for a similar manipulation, see Yang & Pourtois, 2018).  
Additionally, we also measured negative affect (as a state) and its regulation (as a trait). It 
was found previously that conflict is inherently aversive and thus negatively connoted 
(Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). Recently, we also found that the CSE was increased during the 
encounter of integral negative emotion (Yang & Pourtois, 2018). Negative emotion might 
provide another source triggering enhanced control adjustments, given the close ties between 
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defensive motivation and CC (Inzlicht et al., 2015). From this affective perspective, it is 
reasonable to conceive that conflict-driven adaptive control processes could be regarded as a 
form of emotion regulation to some extent (Dignath & Eder, 2015; Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2015). According to a dominant model in the affective sciences literature (Gross, 2002), 
emotion regulation can be divided into different processes or strategies, including suppression 
and cognitive reappraisal. Suppression corresponds to the inhibition or downplaying of 
emotional reactions, once they are elicited, and is usually conceived as mostly reactive. In 
comparison, reappraisal entails changing the meaning of emotional event or reaction, either 
proactively or reactively. Using this framework, we therefore sought to assess in this study 
whether these two different emotion regulation strategies, when conceived as dispositions, 
might correlate with CC and more specifically the CSE. To this end, we adopted an inter-
individual approach and performed correlation analyses between the ERQ (Gross & John, 
2003), state negative affect (using the PANAS, see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998) and the 
CSE, as extracted from the main interference task used in this study. 
Method 
Participants 
Initially, 60 participants were included and 6 of them were excluded from the analyses 
because of a mean accuracy lower than 70%, precluding in turn to obtain enough trials for 
some conditions (such as congruent-Congruent, incongruent-Congruent, or congruent-
Incongruent) when high conflict frequency was considered (i.e. 70% incongruent trials). They 
were compensated with 1 course credit. However, a subsequent power analysis, using 
MorePower (Campbell & Thompson, 2012) and our previous study as prior (Yang & 
Pourtois, 2018), showed that 70 participants had actually to be included to reach a power of 
80% to detect an effect size of 0.15 for the expected significant three-way interaction. 
Accordingly, 16 new participants were added to this initial sample to reach 70 participants in 
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total (mean age = 19.4 years, SD = 2.3, 7 males). These 16 participants received 12 euro as 
compensation. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no history of 
psychiatric or neurological disorders. 
Stimuli and task 
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor and performed a speeded Stroop 
task that was designed to control for effects of feature repetition and contingency learning 
(Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 2014). For each trial, a Stroop stimulus was shown in the center 
of the computer screen until the participant responded. Participants were instructed to identify 
the color of the word as fast and accurately as possible by using four predefined keys of a 
response box. These four keys corresponded to four colors (i.e. red, blue, green, yellow). 
More specifically, they used their left middle finger to respond to red color, left index finger 
to blue color, right index finger to green color, and right middle finger to yellow color.  
The Stroop stimuli consisted of four words (in Dutch) (“rood”/red, “blauw”/blue, 
“groen”/green, or “geel”/yellow; font size, 30 points) presented in one out of four possible 
colors (red, RGB: 255, 0, 0; blue, RGB: 0, 176, 240; green, RGB: 0, 255, 0; yellow, RGB: 
255, 255, 0). For a given participant, each word was presented in only two of the four possible 
colors however (see below). To rule out contingency learning, a four-alternative forced choice 
(4-AFC) task was used (Schmidt & Weissman, 2014; Weissman et al., 2014), where two pairs 
of S-R were created arbitrarily to balance congruent and incongruent trials. Each pair 
consisted of two words and two colors such that incongruent trials were created for the 
(incompatible) word-color association within each pair, but not across pairs. According to this 
rule, 8 stimuli types were created in total (instead of 16 if all combinations were constructed), 
corresponding to 4 stimuli for congruent trials and 4 stimuli for incongruent trials. Each word 
was presented equally often in the congruent and incongruent color in each block within each 
mapping (Mordkoff, 2012). 
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Reactive control was promoted by having 50% incongruent trials in half of the blocks; a 
condition labeled “low conflict frequency” in our study. By comparison, proactive control 
was increased by having 70% incongruent trials in the other half of the blocks, corresponding 
to the “high conflict frequency” condition. Each block included 81 trials. As a result, under 
low conflict frequency, each of the 8 stimuli was presented 10 times. Under high conflict 
frequency, each of the 4 congruent stimuli was presented 6 times, while each of the 4 
incongruent stimuli was presented 14 times. To rule out feature repetitions across successive 
trials, the stimuli were systematically alternated across them. This way, we ensured that there 
was no stimulus (or response) repetition for both goal-relevant (color) and goal-irrelevant 
(meaning) dimensions.  
Procedure 
Each trial started with a fixation cross that was used as ITI, with a mean duration of 500ms 
(range: 400-600ms). After the fixation cross, the Stroop stimulus was presented in the middle 
of the screen for 1000ms or until a response was given, followed by a black screen shown for 
700ms, before either an evaluative or a neutral feedback was presented centrally for 700ms 
(see Figure 1). For the evaluative feedback (Figure 1A) either a positive feedback signaled by 
a black tick mark was provided if the response was correct and fast enough (i.e., falling below 
the response deadline corresponding to an arbitrary time limit, explained in more detail 
below), or a negative feedback signaled by a black cross was provided if the response was 
incorrect or too slow (i.e., above this time limit). The neutral feedback (Figure 1B) signaled 
by a black square indicated a response had been made, without specific information provided 
about task performance however. With regard to the time limit, we used an algorithm 
previously validated that enforces fast responding (Vocat, Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008; 
Aarts & Pourtois, 2010). Unknown to participants, the reaction time (RT) cutoff was updated 
on a trial-by-trial basis to deal with unwanted fatigue or habituation effects throughout the 
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experimental session (see Yang & Pourtois, 2018 for a detailed presentation of the algorithm 
used). 
Before the start of the experiment, participants gave informed consent and performed a 
practice session that consisted of four blocks comprising 13 trials each. The experimental 
session consisted of 16 blocks including 81 trials each, divided into four main conditions: 
Low conflict frequency-evaluative feedback (Condition A), Low conflict frequency-neutral 
feedback (Condition B), High conflict frequency-evaluative feedback (Condition C), and 
High conflict frequency-neutral feedback (Condition D). Each condition included 4 blocks 
that were shown successively (“tetrad”). Low conflict frequency was used for Conditions A 
and B but evaluative feedback was presented for Condition A, whereas neutral feedback was 
used for Condition B. By comparison, High conflict frequency was used for Conditions C and 
D, where evaluative feedback was presented in the former but neutral feedback in the latter. 
Four specific orders were created a priori and counterbalanced across participants: A-D-C-B, 
B-C-D-A, C-B-A-D, and D-A-B-C. Although participants could not rely on the trial-by-trial 
feedback to infer their task performance in Conditions B and D, however, negative and 
positive feedback (depending on actual speed and accuracy) were registered online (and used 
offline for data analysis) using the same response deadline as in Conditions A and C. As a 
result, the blocks with either evaluative or neutral feedback were matched in terms of 
proportion of negative feedback received (see Table 1). Hence, evaluative and neutral 
feedbacks only differed in terms of motivational significance of the feedback, being high 
(evaluative feedback) or absent (neutral feedback), while trial selection was roughly balanced 
between them. For Conditions A and C, a general feedback was provided at the end of each 
block, indicating ‘the number of trials associated with too slow RTs’, ‘the number of trials 
associated with response errors’. No such general feedback was provided at the end of each 
block for Conditions B and D. At the start of each block, participants were encouraged to 
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make accurate and fast responses. In between blocks, self-paced breaks were allowed. Stimuli 
were shown in a pseudo-random order within each block to lead to the same number of 
congruent-Congruent (cC), congruent-Incongruent (cI), incongruent-Congruent (iC) and 
incongruent-Incongruent (iI) trials. In low conflict frequency blocks (A and B), this was easily 
achieved. However, as more incongruent than congruent trials were used in high conflict 
frequency blocks (C and D), there were thus more iI trials available (44 trials per block) but 
fewer trials for cC, cI, iC trials (12 trials per block for each of them). Stimuli presentation and 
data recording were controlled using E-Prime (Version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools Inc., 
Sharpsburg, PA). 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Fig 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Questionnaires 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
A Dutch version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used to 
measure possible changes in negative/positive emotion between the four different conditions. 
We analyzed possible changes in negative affect using this scale as we recently found that it 
increased conflict adaptation (Yang & Pourtois, 2018). The scale consists of 20 words that 
describe different feelings and emotions (10 – item for negative affect, 10 – item for positive 
affect) (Watson et al., 1998). The PANAS was administered at the end of the practice session 
for the first time. It was then re-administered after each tetrad to measure the corresponding 
change in mood depending on the specific condition (A, B, C or D). Participants were asked 
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to report their subjective feelings by rating the items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 – Very 
slightly or not at all to 5 – Extremely. In addition, the order of these 20 items was alternated 
across the 5 measurement points to reduce the use of any predefined response strategy, or the 
anticipation of specific emotional words.  
PSWQ 
At the end of the experiment, we also administered the Dutch version of the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) to perform exploratory analyses 
between CSE and the disposition to worry, as well as the strategies used by the subjects to 
regulate their emotions (with the distinction made between re-appraisal and suppression). 
Data analyses 
Although we focused primarily on the CSE, we also analyzed the congruency effect (CE, 
see Supplementary materials). For the CSE, the first trial of each block, error trials, post-error 
trials, and outlier trials (i.e. RTs +/- 3 SD from the condition-specific mean, calculated for 
each subject separately) were excluded from further analyses, leading to a total of 29% of 
trials excluded.  
Mean RT was computed for each condition separately. Mean RTs were submitted to an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Conflict frequency (low vs. high), Feedback type 
(evaluative vs. neutral), Previous congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and Current 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subject factors. We also analyzed and 
reported the error rates (see Results section) using the same statistical model although our 




    The values of negative and positive affect were obtained from the sum of scores on 
negative and positive items, respectively. The resulting PANAS values were then submitted to 
an ANOVA with Conflict frequency (low vs. high), Feedback type (evaluative vs. neutral), 
and Affect (negative, positive) as within-subject factors. 
Exploratory correlation analyses between CSE and subjective ratings 
In order to determine whether the CSE was influenced by negative affect defined as state 
(PANAS) or trait (PSWQ), as well as its regulation (ERQ where we separated suppression 
from reappraisal), we performed a stepwise regression analysis. In the model, the CSE 
obtained for Condition A (low conflict frequency when evaluative feedback was used) was 
included as main depend variable together with PANAS, PSWQ, cognitive reappraisal (one 
subscale of the ERQ), and suppression (the other subscale of the ERQ) as predictor variables. 
This regression analysis was based on 69 participants since the data of one participant was 
missing. 
A standard alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.  
Results 
RTs 
The ANOVA showed that the main effect of Conflict frequency was marginally significant, 
F(1, 69) = 3.525, p = .065, ƞp2 = 0.049, with faster RTs in high than low conflict frequency 
conditions. The main effect of Feedback type was significant, F(1, 69) = 72.237, p < .001, ƞp2 
= 0.511, with faster RTs in blocks where evaluative feedback was used, relative to neutral 
feedback. The main effect of Previous congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 7.766, p = .007, 
ƞp2 = 0.101, with faster RTs following incongruent than congruent trials, as well as the main 
effect of Current congruency, F(1, 69) = 128.117, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.650, with faster RTs for 
congruent than incongruent trials. Furthermore, the three way interaction of Conflict 
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frequency, Previous congruency, and Current congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 6.760,  p 
= .011, ƞp2 = 0.089, indicating that the CSE was modulated by Conflict frequency. Crucially, 
the four-way interaction between Conflict frequency, Feedback type, Previous congruency 
and Current congruency was significant too, F(1, 69) = 4.928, p = .030, ƞp2 = 0.067, indicating 
that CSE was influenced concurrently by Conflict frequency throughout the block and the 
type of feedback information used at the single trial level (Figure 2). To better characterize 
this four-way interaction, we ran two separate ANOVAs with Conflict frequency, Previous 
congruency, and Current congruency, separately for evaluative and neutral feedback. For 
evaluative feedback, the main effect of Conflict frequency was significant, F(1, 69) = 5.925, p 
= .018, ƞp2 = 0.079. The Current congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 86.159, p < .001, ƞp2 
= 0.555. Importantly, the three-way interaction was highly significant, F(1, 69) = 13.209, p = 
.001, ƞp2 = 0.161, indicating that the CSE was modulated by Conflict frequency, when the 
Feedback type was evaluative. To further examine this, we therefore performed planned 
comparisons, separately for low and high conflict frequency. For low conflict frequency 
(Figure 2), the Current congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 47.944, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.410, 
as well as the interaction of Previous with Current congruency, F(1, 69) = 6.428, p = 0.014, 
ƞp2 = 0.085. This effect was explained by faster response for iI compared with cI, t(69) = -
2.419, p = .018, 95% CI [-9.27, -0.89], whereas no difference between cC and iC was 
observed, t(69) = -0.868, p = .388, 95% CI [-7.44, 2.93]. By comparison, for high conflict 
frequency (Figure 2), the Previous congruency effect was significant, F(1, 69) = 4.554, p = 
.036, ƞp2 = 0.062, the Current congruency too, F(1, 69) = 54.644, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.442, as well 
as the interaction of Previous with Current congruency, F(1, 69) = 5.690, p = 0.020, ƞp2 = 
0.076. This effect was explained by faster response for iC compared with cC, t(69) = -2.977, p 
= .004, 95% CI [-13.51, -2.67], whereas no difference was observed between cI and iI was 
observed, t(69) = -0.413, p = .681, 95% CI [-5.59, 3.67]. 
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For neutral feedback (see Figures 2CD), both the Previous congruency, F(1, 69) = 6.362, p 
= .014, ƞp2 = 0.084, and the Current congruency, F(1, 69) = 96.858, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.584, 
were significant. No any other reliable effect was found, Fs(1, 69) ≤ 2.054, ps ≥ .156, ƞp2s ≤ 
0.029. Last, we also performed a control analysis (see Supplementary Materials) to confirm 
that the modulation of the CSE by conflict frequency and feedback type was not simply due to 
systematic changes occurring at the trial n-1 level. 
Error rates 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Feedback type, F(1, 69) = 41.932, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = 0.378, with higher error rates for evaluative than neutral feedback; a significant 
main effect of Previous congruency, F(1, 69) = 20.628, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.230, with higher 
error rates following congruent relative to incongruent trials. This analysis also showed that 
the interaction between Feedback type with Previous congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 
13.932, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.168. This effect was explained by higher error rates following 
congruent than incongruent trials when neutral feedback was used, t(69) = 6.398, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.151, 0.289], whereas there was no significant difference between congruent and 
incongruent trials when evaluative feedback was used, t(69) = 0.046, p = .964, 95% CI [-
0.008, 0.008]. In addition, the significant interaction of Previous congruency with Current 
congruency was significant, F(1, 69) = 4.658, p = .034, ƞp2 = 0.063. This effect was driven by 
higher error rates for cC than iC trials, t(69) = 4.195, p < .001, 95% CI [0.009, 0.026], 
whereas there was no significant difference between cI and iI trials, t(69) = 1.382, p = .171, 
95% CI [-0.002, 0.116]. No other significant effects were found, Fs(1, 69) ≤ 3.596, ps ≥ 
0.062, ƞp2s ≤ 0.050. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Fig 2 about here 
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                                                   -------------------------------- 
Subjective ratings 
The ANOVA showed a significant effect of Feedback type, with higher subjective ratings 
for conditions with evaluative feedback (A and C) compared to neutral feedback (B and D), 
F(1, 69) = 12.123, p = .001, ƞp2 = 0.149. This analysis also showed a significant effect of 
Affect, with higher subjective ratings for positive than negative affect, F(1, 69) = 22.102, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = 0.243. Further, the interaction of Conflict frequency with Affect was significant, 
F(1, 69) = 6.295, p = .014, ƞp2 = 0.084. This interaction indicated lower positive feelings in 
the low (A and B) compared with high (C and D) conflict frequency conditions, t(69) = -
1.966, p = 0.053, 95% CI [-2.547, 0.1859], whereas negative feelings did not differ between 
them, t(69) = 1.612, p = 1.112, 95% CI [-0.149, 1.406]. The interaction of Feedback type with 
Affect was significant as well, F(1, 69) = 16.281, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.191. This interaction 
translated higher negative feelings in Conditions (A and C) with evaluative-feedback 
compared with Conditions without (B and D), t(69) = 5.037, p < 0.001, 95% CI [1.631, 
3.769], whereas the opposite pattern was found for positive feelings, t(69) = -2.653, p = 0.010, 
95% CI [-1.915, -0.271] (see Figure 3A). Post-hoc paired t-tests showed that levels of 
negative feelings during the practice session was significantly lower than that in Conditions 
with the evaluative feedback (A and C), t(69) ≥ 2.138, ps ≤ .036. By comparison, levels of 
positive feelings during the practice session were significantly higher than those of any other 
experimental condition, ts(69) ≥ 7.876, ps ≤ .001 (see Figure 3A). 
Exploratory correlation analyses 
When cognitive reappraisal was entered alone into the regression model, it predicted 
significantly the CSE, F(1, 68) = 8.076, p = .006. Noteworthy, we used the CSE as dependent 
variable computed in the condition with evaluative feedback under low conflict frequency 
because it was the condition where it was the most clearly expressed (see Figure 3B). 
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Approximately 13% of the variance of the CSE could be accounted by cognitive reappraisal. 
More specifically, cognitive reappraisal was negatively related to the CSE, unstandardized β = 
-1.402, t(68) = -2.842, p = .006, CI 95% [-2.386, -0.417]. By comparison, we did not find a 
significant correlation between suppression and the CSE (see Figure 3C). When comparing 
these two correlation coefficients directly, a significant difference was found, using a one-
tailed test, z = 1.73, p = 0.04. The PSWQ and PANAS did not predict the CSE, t(68) ≤ 0.906, 
p ≥ .368. See the correlation matrix for all variables (CSE, Reappraisal, Suppression, PSWQ, 
PANAS) in Table 2.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Fig 3 about here 
                                                   -------------------------------- 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                                   -------------------------------- 
Discussion  
The current study sought to explore the involvement of reactive vs. proactive control in 
conflict-related trial by trial adjustments, as reflected by the CSE. To this aim, we used a 
variant of the Stroop task where we controlled for effects of feature repetition and 
contingency learning across trials (Schmidt & Weissman, 2014; Weissman et al., 2014). We 
computed the CSE following standard practice, and alternated conflict frequency across 
blocks. Reactive control was presumably increased when conflict frequency was set to 50%, 
whereas proactive mechanisms were likely at stake when conflict frequency was set to 70% 
(Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007, Braver, 2012). Orthogonally to this main variable, we 
manipulated the nature of the feedback provided on a trial by trial basis, being either 
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explicitly evaluative (i.e. informing about self-efficacy) or totally neutral (i.e. valence 
unspecific and not informing about self-efficacy), while being both always contingent on 
response execution. Our results confirm the hypothesis that the CSE was influenced by 
conflict frequency and feedback type concurrently. In the evaluative feedback condition, the 
CSE was influenced by conflict frequency. There: a normal CSE was observed when conflict 
frequency was low, whereas a qualitatively different sequence effect was observed when 
conflict frequency was high. In this latter condition, the interaction between previous and 
current congruency was driven by the difference between cC and iC rather than between cI 
and iI. In contrast, the modulatory influence of conflict frequency on the CSE was abolished 
when neutral feedback was used throughout the block.  
When the feedback was evaluative, a typical CSE was observed if conflict frequency was 
low. Presumably, the performance-contingent feedback enhanced conflict-driven control 
processes operating at a local level. This boost in CC might stem from changes in specific 
motivation processes (Van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2015), especially if the previous 
trial was conflict-related (Hinault, Badier, Baillet, & Lemaire, 2017). Interestingly, in high 
conflict frequency, the previous and current congruency also interacted with one another, 
revealing a systematic slowing done for cC relative to iC trials. These two effects accord well 
with the DMC model (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007, Braver, 2012) assuming that changes 
in conflict frequency alter the balance between proactive and reactive control. When conflict 
frequency was high, the cC sequence was probably unexpected and/or violating a specific 
mind set or preparation process geared towards conflict processing, resulting in turn in a 
systematic slowing done for these infrequent cC trials (Gonthier, Braver, & Bugg, 2016).  
By comparison, when encountering neutral feedback, no clear sequence effect was 
observed, irrespective of the specific conflict frequency used. This result is compatible with 
earlier findings showing that at low or moderate conflict frequency, the CSE disappears after 
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neutral, compared to evaluative feedback (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012). 
At high conflict frequency, we propose that neutral feedback might block the use of proactive 
control because the motivational significance of conflict is reduced in this condition. 
From a cognitive perspective, the modulation of the CSE by the feedback type for low 
conflict frequency might be explained by the involvement of specific motivational or 
attentional processes operating at a local level (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). However, 
the elicitation of negative affect at the subjective level when encountering evaluative 
feedback, as the PANAS results clearly showed, might also provide an important ingredient to 
foster enhanced (reactive) control (Yang & Pourtois, 2018). Earlier studies already 
demonstrated strong ties between conflict processing and negative affect; conflict-related 
stimuli being usually perceived as aversive events (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Fritz & 
Dreisbach, 2013; Schouppe et al., 2012, 2015). Yet, it is important to underscore that this 
enhanced negative affect associated with the use of evaluative feedback had to occur in a 
context of reactive control in order to influence the CSE. Accordingly, the evaluative 
feedback likely provided participants with a valuable motivational signal or cue that could be 
used to foster CC (Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 2015), especially when it operated reactively 
and locally. Alternatively, this evaluative feedback likely promoted a fast associative learning 
under reactive control, which in turn enhanced CC, as recently advocated (Abrahamse, 
Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016).  
Previous findings already reported a preferential link between negative affect and reactive, 
as opposed to proactive control (West, Choi, & Travers, 2010; Braver et al., 2007; Shackman 
et al., 2011). Our new results lend support to this assumption, albeit indirectly only. Indeed, 
we did not observe increased negative affect at the PANAS level under reactive (low conflict 
frequency) compared to proactive (high conflict frequency) control, but decreased positive 
affect, selectively. However, it should be noted that the relationship between positive and 
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negative affect, as obtained using the PANAS, is usually complex and cannot simply be 
captured by a negative correlation for example (Harding, 1982; Warr, Barter, & Brownbridge, 
1983; Rossi & Pourtois, 2012). As suggested by Diener and Emmons (1984), positive and 
negative affect are not necessarily negatively related, but instead, they can be mutually 
exclusive because they are unlikely to occur at the same time. Hence, it appears parsimonious 
to conclude that the observed decreased positive affect in low compared with high conflict 
frequency in our study only indirectly supports the view that negative affect is positively 
related to the engagement of reactive control (West, Choi, & Travers, 2010). 
Noteworthy, we also found that cognitive reappraisal negatively correlated with the CSE. In 
contrast, this link was not found with CC when suppression was considered as alternative 
emotion regulation strategy in our study. Reappraisal is usually conceived as an adaptive 
emotion regulation strategy enabling individuals to downplay the impact of negative events or 
emotions by changing their meaning, usually in a way which is proactive or antecedent 
relative to them (Gross, 2002). Hence, these correlations results suggest that dispositions 
related to the use of specific regulation strategies characterized by proactive processes can 
influence CC. More specifically, our new results suggest that participants who usually used 
reappraisal in daily life actually had a lower CSE, as if they used implicitly proactive control 
during task execution, even though reactive control was actually elicited. Hence, trial-by-trial 
adjustments in control were influenced by reappraisal, this disposition likely producing a shift 
from reactive to proactive control processes. Therefore, besides the context defined by the 
frequency of incongruent trials and the use of evaluative feedback to reinforce it (or the lack 
thereof), inter-individual differences in specific dispositions, here with a focus on emotion 
regulation and more specifically reappraisal eventually combined to determine the 
engagement of proactive vs. reactive control strategies to deal with conflict (Braver et al., 
2007). More generally, our new results are compatible with recent data and models available 
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in the literature arguing that emotion regulation, besides conflict processing per se, can 
dynamically influence CC (Dignath & Eder, 2015; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015). In this 
context, it appears therefore important to consider and model carefully inter-individual 
differences in emotion regulation, or other dispositions, when exploring this fundamental 
process as they appear to influence it substantially (see also Braver, 2012; Braver, Cole, & 
Yarkoni, 2010; Egner, 2011).  
A limitation warrants comment. Although we used stringent methodological guards against 
stimulus repetition, response repetition and contingency learning with the elected Stroop task 
(see Weissman, Jiang, & Egner, 2014), it remains hard to exclude the contribution of feature 
binding to the observed results (Hommel, 2004), especially when conflict frequency was high 
(Blais & Bunge, 2010; Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 2008). The systematic slowing down in RTs for 
cC compared with iC trials, and iI compared with cI trials in this condition might both be 
explained by feature binding to some extent, in the sense that the processing of stimuli 
associated with conflict, because being more frequently encountered in these blocks, was in 
turn facilitated somehow (Blais & Bunge, 2010; Bugg, Jacoby, & Toth, 2008; Bugg & 
Chanani, 2011). Future studies using factorial manipulations of feature binding and conflict 
frequency are needed to model and assess their respective contributions to the CSE. 
To sum up, the results of this study confirmed a preferential link between conflict 
adaptation (i.e. the CSE) and the use of reactive control operating at a local level, being 
potentiated by the use of evaluative feedback contingent on task performance. Dissociable 
trial by trial adjustments as a function of conflict processing were found when proactive 
control was elicited. Moreover, the transient elicitation of negative affect with this evaluative 
feedback likely contributed to foster conflict adaptation, yet when reactive control dominated, 
suggesting that negative affect alone was not sufficient to create or change conflict adaptation. 
Interestingly, reappraisal, when considered as a disposition, substantially reduced conflict 
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adaptation as if this regulation strategy promoted the use of proactive control even though the 
context favored reactive control. Accordingly, we propose that CC is flexible and can yield 
different manifestations at the behavioral level depending on the specific balance between 
proactive and reactive control modes, as well as the activation of specific affective and 
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Fig 1. Experimental procedure. Each trial started with a fixation cross (that lasted on average 
500ms), followed by the Stroop stimulus. In half of the blocks, incongruent trials were more 
frequent than congruent ones, yielding proactive control. In the other half, the same frequency 
of congruent and incongruent trials was used, generating reactive control. A blank screen 
ensued, before either an evaluative feedback (A) or a neutral feedback (B) was presented in 
different blocks. The figure shows an example of a cI trial for these two main conditions. 
Fig 2. Behavioral results for the CSE. Low conflict-Evaluative FB. A normal CSE was 
observed under low conflict frequency, when evaluative feedback was used selectively. High 
conflict-Evaluative FB. Under high conflict frequency when evaluative feedback was used, a 
different sequence effect was found whereby cC trials led to a systematic slowing done 
compared to iC trials. Low conflict-Neutral FB. No reliable CSE was observed under low 
conflict frequency when neutral feedback was used. High conflict-Neutral FB. No reliable 
CSE was observed under high conflict frequency when neutral feedback was used. The error 
bar represents the standard error (SE). ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Fig 3. Subjective ratings and correlations between affect and task performance (CSE). A. 
PANAS results showed subjective positive affect was lower in the low compared with high 
conflict frequency conditions, with no difference in negative affect between them. Subjective 
negative affect was higher in Conditions with evaluative feedback compared with Conditions 
without, the pattern for positive affect was opposite. B. A significant negative correlation was 
found between cognitive reappraisal and CSE (when computed for the condition with low 
conflict frequency and the use of evaluative feedback). C. No significant correlation was 
found between suppression and CSE in this condition. The error bar represents the standard 



























Proportion (expressed in percentage) of negative feedback for blocks with evaluative vs. neutral feedbacks, 
separately for the low and high conflict frequency 
 50% of incongruency 70% of incongruency 
 Evaluative FB Neutral FB Evaluative FB Neutral FB 
After Congruent 55.73% 55.63% 55.75% 55.86% 






























Correlation matrix for all variables 
 CSE Reappraisal Suppression PSWQ PANAS 
CSE 1 -0.328** -0.04 -0.091 0.036 
Reappraisal -0.328** 1 -0.053 -0.029 -0.125 
Suppression -0.04 -0.053 1 -0.082 -0.043 
PSWQ -0.091 -0.029 -0.082 1 0.076 
PANAS 0.036 -0.125 -0.043 0.076 1 
















Supplemental materials:  
 
Congruency effect (CE) 
Data analyses 
For each subject separately, error trials and outlier trials (i.e. RTs +/- 3 SD from the CE 
condition-specific mean, calculated for each subject separately) were excluded from further 
analyses (amounting 15.82%). Mean RTs (and error rates) were submitted to an ANOVA with 
Conflict frequency (low vs. high), Feedback type (evaluative vs. neutral), and Congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subject factors.  
Results 
RTs 
The ANOVA showed a marginally significant main effect of Conflict frequency, F(1, 69) = 
3.237, p = .076, ƞp2 = 0.045, with faster RTs in high frequency than in low frequency of 
conflict blocks, a significant main effect of Feedback type, F(1, 69) = 71.977, p < .001, ƞp2 = 
0.511, with faster RTs in blocks where evaluative feedback was used, relative to neutral 
feedback, a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 69) = 101.728, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.596, 
with faster RTs for congruent than incongruent trials. No other significant effects were found, 
Fs(1, 69) ≤ 2.935, ps ≥ 0.091, ƞp2s ≤ 0.041. 
Error rates 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Feedback type, F(1, 69) = 48.666, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = 0.414, with higher error rate in the evaluative feedback than in the neutral 
feedback. No other significant effects were found, Fs(1, 69) ≤ 2.339, ps ≥ 0.131, ƞp2s ≤ 0.033. 
The effect of previous congruency 
To rule out that the modulation of Conflict frequency and Feedback type on the CSE was 
due to differences in conflict processing occurring already during the previous trial, we 
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performed a control analysis using trials-1 only. We performed an ANOVA with Previous 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), Conflict frequency (low vs. high), and Feedback 
type (evaluative vs. neutral) as within-subject factors, using RTs for correct responses at the 
trial-1 level. This analysis revealed that the main effect of Previous congruency was 
significant, F(1, 69) = 7.735, p = .007, ƞp2 = 0.101, with faster RTs following incongruent 
compared with congruent trials. The main effect of Conflict frequency was marginally 
significant, F(1, 69) = 3.527, p = .065, ƞp2 = 0.049, with faster RTs in high, compared to low 
conflict frequency. The main effect of Feedback type was significant, F(1, 69) = 72.274, p 
< .001, ƞp2 = 0.512, with faster RTs in the evaluative compared with the neutral feedback 
condition. Importantly, interactions of Previous congruency with Conflict frequency, F(1, 69) 
= 2.92, p = .591, ƞp2 = 0.004, or Previous congruency with Feedback type, F(1, 69) = 0.296, p 
= .588, ƞp2 = 0.004, were not significant. 
 
 
 
